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CASE COMMENTS
tions can be erased from it. The case seems to present a more
rational approach to the problem than does the principal case. It
is submitted that the caution necessary in the use of inaudible
recordings is not provided by the cases which base their admission
or exclusion on the analogy used by the court in the Cape case, and
that a more desirable approach is represented by the Wright decision.
John George Van Meter
Federal Courts-Jurisdictional Amount-Legal Certainty
In an action grounded on diversity of citizenship in the District
Court of the Southern District of West Virginia, P claimed dam-
ages in the amount of 6,000 dollars for breach of contract. P based
his claim on the premise that the statement for 2,960 dollars sent
to D for professional services as an architect was merely a com-
promise offer and could not become an account stated without the
acceptance by D. D moved to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction
of the court on the ground that the amount actually in controversy
was less than 3,000 dollars because P could not recover more than
this amount by the terms of the contract. The motion was granted.
The Court of Appeals held that the District Court was without
jurisdiction where, from a statement sent by P to D, it appeared as
a legal certainty that P could not recover the jurisdictional minimum.
Nixon v. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge No. 750, 285 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. 1960).
A federal court will dismiss a diversity action for want of jur-
isdiction if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot
recover the jurisdictional minimum. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). The federal district
court was bound to apply West Virginia law, Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and it thus appears that under the
facts of the principal case that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of 3,000
dollars.
The court said that P's recovery was limited by the terms of
the written agreement. However, P contended that the statement
he sent was merely a compromise offer to D which was not accepted
by D. Furthermore, P contended that there was nothing in the
contract which made it incumbent upon him to make the reasonable
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estimated cost of the building. P cited the following West Virginia
decisions in support of his compromise theory: Smith v. Atlas
Pocahontas Coal Co., 66 W. Va. 559, 66 S.E. 746 (1909), and
Gillespie v. Scottish Ins. Co., 61 W. Va. 169, 56 S.E. 213 (1906).
These cases hold respectively that an offer to compromise a dis-
pute as to the amount of damages for breach of a mining contract
and as to the balance due on a note involving claims for an unascer-
tained sum, but which offer is not accepted, is not a bar to an action
to recover the full amount claimed to be due. D distinguished P's
cases on their facts, while citing Orth v. Board of Educ., 272 Pa.
411, 116 A. 366 (1922), 3 AM. JUR. Architects § 11 (1936),
and Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1356 (1922) in support of D's position that
P's own estimate which accompanies his plans is the reasonable
estimated cost intended by the contract. Thus, P cannot recover
more than 6% of this cost estimate. Certainly there is nothing
wrong with the law in D's citations, but they are merely persuasive
authority and not binding upon the courts in West Virginia. 1 BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.4 (1935). Therefore, since D contends
that P's West Virginia citations are not on point and the only law
cited by D to support his argument is from foreign jurisdictions,
it would seem that the issue under discussion has not been decided
in West Virginia.
With the authorities in this posture, it appears dubious that
it can be accurately stated that the recovery sought by the plaintiff
is denied by West Virginia law to a legal certainty.
There is a possible second theory upon which this conclusion
could have been reached. Thus, P's demand of D for the 2,960
dollars may have been viewed as an account stated.
When looking at the arguments upon P's account rendered
theory, the same difficulty of unsettled law in West Virginia is en-
countered. P cites E. I. Du Pont etc. Co. v. Valley Supply Co., 119
W. Va. 645, 195 S.E. 596 (1938), and LeGrand v. Hambrick, 116
W. Va. 572, 182 S.E. 577 (1935) in support of the proposition
that an account rendered is only converted into an account stated
by the express or implied assent of the party to be charged. Again,
the factual situations were distinguished by D, while again only cit-
ing the same secondary authority. Obviously, for the same reasons,
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No further West Virginia authority was found which would
tend to clear up the uncertainty as to the issues involved here.
However, some authority was found concerning accounts stated
which would tend further to indicate that the question is unsettled
under West Virginia law. In Hoover-Dimeling Lumber Co. v. Neill,
77 W. Va. 470, 87 S:E. 855 (1916), the court said that an ac-
count stated does not create an estoppel, although it affords pre-
sumptive evidence of the accuracy and correctness of the charges
stated. The court added that such presumption may be rebutted
by showing fraud, mistake or error in its execution or procurement
unless the position of the opposite party has been altered to his
prejudice. While not saying that P in the principal case could bring
himself within this rule of law, can it be said as a legal certainty
that P cannot rebut the accuracy and correctness of the account
stated? To be a legal certainty in this jurisdiction, would it not
require a decision on this precise point by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia? Furthermore, any rebuttal evidence
should go to the jury. Antonowich v. Home Life Ins. Co., 116 W. Va.
155, 179 S.E. 601 (1935).
In addition to the unsettled problems already presented by
the principal case, one more might be added. The rule that an
account rendered is converted into an account stated by the passage
of time without objection is generally inapplicable in West Virginia,
except as between merchant and merchant, and principal and agent,
with mutual accounts. Price Hill Colliery Co. v. Pinkney, 96 W. Va.
74, 122 S.E. 434 (1924); McGraw v. Trader's National Bank, 64
W. Va. 509, 63 S.E. 398 (1908). Is an architect an agent? No
West Virginia cases were found treating this question. But to give
some idea of the problem involved, Mackay v. Benjamin Franklin
Realty & Holding Co., 288 Pa. 207, 135 Atl. 613 (1927) held that
as far as the preparation of plans is concerned, an architect gen-
erally acts as an independent contractor. But in Edward Barron
Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351 (1912),
the court said that when performing supervisory functions, an
architect ordinarily acts as an agent. In the principal case, P appar-
ently never progressed beyond the preparation of plans phase of
his contract. It would seem then, that before the court in the prin-
cipal case could nile that it was a legal certainty that P's state-
ment had become an account stated, that the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia would have had to have previously de-
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cided that an account stated could be created between an architect
and his employer.
The court refused to take jurisdiction in the principal case on
the ground that it appeared to a legal certainty that P could not
recover the jurisdictional minimum. In reaching this decision, the
court was apparently convinced by law decided in jurisdictions other
than West Virginia. Since the law was not settled in West Virginia,
the court's procedure appears to be contrary to accepted jurisdic-
tional principles. Calhoun v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co., 166
F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1948). There is no doubt that if the court had
taken jurisdiction that it would have probably been justiifed in
ruling that P could not recover more than the amount listed on his
statement. But the point proposed is that the better procedure would
seem to be that the court should have taken jurisdiction and then
decided the law. This would have precluded the creation of any
ambiguity as to how a legal certainty is determined, thereby making
the path a little easier for subsequent litigants who must prognosticate.
Esdel Beane Yost
Federal Courts-Limitations on the Use of the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act in Determining the Validity of Fund Transfers
Under the Labor Management Relations Act
Ps, trustees of a joint labor-management health and welfare
fund, sought a determination of the validity of a proposed transfer
of surplus funds in the health and welfare fund to a newly estab-
lished pension plan. Ds are the union and management. Action
is for a declaratory judgment. Held, dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. The Declaratory Judgment Act did not give federal courts
jurisdiction over the administration of trusts, but only enlarged the
range of remedies where federal jurisdiction previously existed.
Kane v. Shulton, Inc., 189 F. Supp 882 (D.N.J. 1960).
An understanding of the statutes imposing restrictions on
payments to employee representatives is necessary in order to fully
understand the issue presented by the instant case. Payments or
contributions by employers and receipts or acceptance by repre-
sentatives of employees of money or other things of value are ex-
pressly prohibited, with certain specific exceptions. 61 STAT. 157
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952). Included among the exceptions
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